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Boys Markets Injunctions in Sympathy Strike Situations:
A Return to Pre-Norris-La Guardia Days?
In the process of a century and a half of growth, the labor movement has evolved a distinctive code of sentiments in which solidarity
and democracy figure prominently. ....
Persisting, too, is the
creed that "an injury to one is an injury to all," reflected, say, in the
unionist's normal repugnance to crossing a picket line of another
union.'
It has long been a tradition in the American labor movement that
a union man or woman will not cross the picket line of another union.
Sometimes the question of the rights of such individuals arises when a
union supporter has to decide whether or not to cross a picket line
encountered in the course of his or her employment. Different questions arise in what, for purposes of -this article, shall be called a "sympathy strike situation": where strikers of one union picket the place of
employment of members of another union and where the latter union's
collective bargaining agreement contains some form of no-strike clause.
It is generally agreed that there is a right to strike and a right to refuse to cross the picket line of another union. Protection is afforded to
these rights by the National Labor Relations Act,2 the Norris-La
Guardia Act,' and decisions of the courts' and the National Labor
Relations Board. 5 These rights are not absolute and have been qualified by statutory, judicial, and administrative decisions.' Despite such
1. J. BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION, A SruDy OF THE MAINSPRINGS OF UNIONISM 222 (1948).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), See sections 7, 8, and 13 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 158, 163 (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121 (1963);
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 28 L.R.R.M. 2105 (1951); Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 79 L.R.R.M. 2897 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
850, 81 L.R.R.M. 2390 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210
(May 21, 1974), enforced, Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 88
L.R.R.M. 2830 (7th Cir. 1975).
6. E.g., section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(4) (1970) (no right to strike for secondary purposes, for recognition as bargaining representative under certain conditions, or for jurisdictional or work-assignment purposes);
section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (on

644

1975

Sympathy Strikes

limitations, protection of the right to strike and the right to honor a

picket line remains a fundamental
7
policy.

part of our national labor

There is disagreement, however, as to the applicability of these
rights in sympathy strike situations. The question of the rights of a

sympathy striker can arise in a number of contexts. An employee may
be fired or otherwise disciplined for failing to report to work.' He or
his union may be sued for breach of contract.9 Prior to the United
States Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770,10 an employer could not obtain an injunction
against a sympathy strike, even if the collective bargaining agreement
contained a no-strike clause. Boys Markets carved an exception into

the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition of injunctive jurisdiction
against labor strikes in the federal courts, holding that in certain circumstances injunctive relief would be available under section 301(a)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)."
The circuits are in conflict with regard to whether and when a Boys
Markets injunction is available in a sympathy strike situation. The
purpose of this article is to examine the decisions on this issue and to
termination of contract or when contract modification desired, union must give 60-day
notice and meet other procedural requirements before strike is protected); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 4 L.R.R.M. 515 (1939) (no right to engage in
a violent or sit-down strike); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252
(1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99, 71 L.R.R.M. 3054 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
920, 73 L.R.R.M. 2537 (1970) (economic striker has only limited rights to reinstatement if permanently replaced during strike); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545,
50 L.R.R.M. 1440 (1962), enforced, 325 F.2d 1011, 54 L.R.R.M. 2707 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905, 55 L.R.R.M. 3023 (1964) (person refusing to cross
picket line in course of employment may be terminated where necessary for efficient
operation of employer's business and where employer replaces employee immediately).
7. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121, 2126
(1963); Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213 (May
21, 1974), enforced, Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M.
2830 (7th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299, 74
L.R.R.M. 2080 (5th Cir. 1970); Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 79 L.R.R.M. 2897
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850, 81 L.R.R.M. 2390 (1972).
8. In such a case the employee and his union may make use of the grievance procedure provided for in the collective bargaining agreement to gain reinstatement or removal of the disciplinary action. If the contract so provides, the matter may eventually
go to arbitration. In addition, the employee or his union may file an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board for violation of the employee's
rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
However, under the current policies of the National Labor Relations Board, assuming
that the collective bargaining agreement has a grievance-arbitration procedure, the
agency is likely to defer to that procedure. For further discussion, see note 161 infra.
9. Such an action may be brought against the union under the Labor-Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
10. 398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M. 2257 (1970).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
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discuss whether they meet the mandate of Boys Markets and other as-

pects of our national labor policy.
THE Boys Markets DECISION

The Norris-LaGuardia Act, enacted in 1932, deprives the federal
courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, except in
certain very limited circumstances. 1 2 The enactment of Norris-LaGuardia was a response to what Congress saw as the manifest abuse of
the injunction remedy by the federal courts, which were regarded as
the allies of management.1 3 By 1947, the labor movement had grown
in strength to the degree that Congress found the need to direct its energies, not to the protection of the right to organize, but rather to the
encouragement of the collective bargaining process and the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes.' 4 The result was the passage of the TaftHartley Act.' 5
Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act expresses a Congressional
policy that arbitration is the preferred method of settling labor grievances.'" In a number of important decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted the Taft-Hartley Act to require great deference to the arbitral
process by the courts. It is against this statutory background that the
Boys Markets decision must be viewed.
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, the Court presented the oftenrepeated view that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act "indicates that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a no-strike agreement."' 17 The idea that each
of these provisions in a collective bargaining agreement is to be considered the bargained-for-equivalent of the other is a presumption on
which the Supreme Court based many later labor decisions.' 8 In Lin12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970); see § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
13. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251, 74
L.R.R.M. 2257, 2262 (1970); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36, 7
L.R.R.M. 267, 271 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 102-03, 7 L.R.R.M. 276, 281-82 (1940). See generally F.
FRANKFURTER AND N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
14. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251, 74
L.R.R.M. 2257, 2263 (1970); Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act,
29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 285 (1960).
15. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-67, 171-97 (1970)).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
17. 353 U.S. 448, 455, 40 LR.R.M. 2113, 2115 (1957).
18. E.g., Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414,
(1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M.
2416 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M.
2423 (1960); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M.
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coin Mills itself, the quid pro quo idea led the Court to hold that section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 19 which provides that labor organizations may sue and be sued in the federal district courts, was
substantive rather than merely jurisdictional in nature. The substantive law to be applied in section 301(a) suits is federal law, fashioned
by the courts from the policies of our national labor laws.2 0 Specifically, the Court held that a union could obtain specific performance of an
employer's agreement to arbitrate grievances.
Lincoln Mills was followed in 1960 by the famous Steelworkers
Trilogy 2' which supplied some extravagant praise for the arbitration
process and greatly limited the functions of the courts in cases involving interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement containing a
grievance-arbitration procedure. In such a case, the court, in order not
to undermine the arbitration process, is only to determine "whether
the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract. ' 22 It is not to review arbitration awards except where the arbitrator has written an opinion that evidences manifest abuse of authority.2 3 Further, in determining whether an issue is
arbitrable, courts should resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration. In
explaining this last point in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., Mr. Justice Douglas introduced the presumption of
arbitrability which has frequently been used by the courts to justify
the issuance of injunctions in sympathy strike situations:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. 24
2257 (1970); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717
(1962); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 85 L.R.R.M. 2049' (1974).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
20. Textile Workers v.Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-56, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113, 211416 (1957).
21. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414 (1960);
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation C., 363 U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416
(1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423
(196D0).
22. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414, 2415
(1960).
23. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98, 46
L.R.R.M. 2423, 2425 (1960). "A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an
award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority
is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award." Id. at 598, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2425.
Further, the arbitrator is not required to write an opinion giving his or her reasons for
the decision reached. Id.
24. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 46
L.R.R.M. 2416, 2419-20 (1960).
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Against this background, the United States Supreme Court in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 77025 decided to overrule its eight
year old SinclairRefining Co. v. Atkinson decision. 8 Sinclair had held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred federal courts from issuing in-

junctions against labor strikes, even though they might be in breach of
a no-strike contractual obligation and even though, under Lincoln
Mills, the court could specifically enforce the agreement for binding
arbitration of the grievance over which the strike was called. The
Boys Markets Court saw its role as one of having to reconcile the
somewhat conflicting policies behind the Norris-LaGuardia and TaftHartley acts. 2 7 The strong federal policy favoring arbitration and the
threat posed to that process by the current law made reconsideration
28
of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson a necessity.
The Boys Markets decision was based in part on the quid pro quo
rationale of Lincoln Mills. The court believed that the incentive for
employers to enter into agreements containing arbitration provisions
was dissipated by the elimination of the most effective tool for the enforcement of a no-strike obligation. 29 The Court believed damages to
be an ineffective substitute for injunctive relief because: (1) irreparable injuries could be caused by the strike; and (2) an action for damages after the strike would not be conducive to industrial peace.3" Reversal of Sinclair was necessary to further the policy set forth by
25.

398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M. 2257 (1970). The Boys Markets decision has reSee, e.g., Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the
Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215; Markson, The End of an
Experiment in Arbitral Supremacy: The Death of Sinclair, 21 LAB. L.J. 645 (1970);
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAsv. L. REV. 1, 192 (1970); Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 Hlv. L. REV. 636 (1972);
Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970).
26. 370 U.S. 195, 50 L.R.R.M. 2420 (1962).
27. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-52, 74
L.R.R.M. 2257, 2262-63 (1970).
28. One of the problems in the current law was created by the Court's decision in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, IAM, 390 U.S. 557, 67 L.R.R.M. 2881 (1968), which
held that suits to enforce no-strike clauses brought in state courts under section 301(a)
were removable to federal courts. The effect of the combination of the decisions in Sinclair and AvcQ was to encourage forum-shopping on the part of labor organizations and
to deprive the states of jurisdiction in suits to enforce no-strike obligations. This result
was inconsistent with two aspects of our national labor policy: (1) that section 301(a)
was intended, not to encroach upon, but to supplement the jurisdiction of the states in
labor disputes; and (2) that consistency in the administration of our labor laws is desirable,
29. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248, 74 L.R.R.M.
2257, 2261-62 (1970). The idea that employers will not agree to arbitration procedures
if the injunction remedy is not available to enforce a no-strike obligation has been criticized by many commentators. See Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions,
79 YALE L.J. 1593, 1598 n.33 (1970), where the author indicates that 94 percent of all
collective bargaining agreements have grievance arbitration procedures.
30. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248, 74 L.R.R.M.
2257, 2262 (1970).

ceived extensive comment.
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Congress in § 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act: the voluntary
estab1
lishment of peaceful methods for settling labor disputes.
The Court held that in certain limited circumstances an employer
could secure injunctive relief against a labor strike. The requirements
for a Boys Markets injunction are: (1) that the collective bargaining
agreement contain a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure; (2)
that the strike be over a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate; (3) that the employer be ordered to arbitrate the
grievance; and (4) that the injunction be warranted under the ordi32
nary principles of equity.
The Boys Markets Court believed it was being faithful to the "core
purpose" of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in creating this limited exception:
Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with
the situation in which a collective bargaining agreement contains
a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor
does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter
of course in every case of a strike over an
arbitrable grievance.3 3
WHAT'S THE STRIKE ABOUT?:
THE UNDERLYING CAUSE REQUIREMENT

The majority position at the circuit court level approves the issuance of Boys Markets injunctions in sympathy strike situations. 34 The
district courts in circuits which have not ruled on the issue are more
evenly divided. 3 To some degree, the differences in the decisions may
31. Id. at 253, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2263-64.
32. Id. at 253-54, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2264.
33. Id.
34. Injunctions have been granted by the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. Only
the Fifth Circuit has refused to issue a Boys Markets injunction in a sympathy strike
situation. See NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d
321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035
(1974); Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364 (3d
Cir. 1975); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 84
L.R.R.M. 2481 (4th Cir. 1973); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311,
86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974);
Wilmington Shipping Co. v. ILA Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW,

505 F.2d 1129, 87 L.R.R.M. 2974 (4th Cir. 1974); nland Steel Co. v. Local
1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733 (7th Cir. 1974); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972).
35. District courts in the First and District of Columbia Circuits have refused injunctions. See Simplex Wire and Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314 F. Supp. 885,
75 L.R.R.M. 2475, (D.N.H. 1970); Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive Lodge 1486,
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be attributable to differences in the facts of the cases-the character
of the "strike," the wording of the relevant contract clauses, etc. Despite such differences, the major distinguishing factor in these cases is
the differing interpretations of the Boys Markets' requirement that the
"'strike . . . sought to be enjoined . . . [be] over a grievance which
both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate.' "
The conflicting viewpoints on this issue are evident in the first two
circuit level decisions in this area: that of the Fifth Circuit in Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters3 7 and that of the Fourth Circuit
in Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW.8 s These two cases
are frequently said to represent the two major trends on this issue.89
Monongahela involved a strike by Local 2357, IBEW, against the
Clarksburgh, West Virginia division of the Monongahela Power
Company. When pickets from Local 2357 were established at the
company's Panhandle division in Weirton, West Virginia, employees
of the latter division, who were represented by Local 2332, IBEW,
did not cross the picket line and a work stoppage resulted. The collective bargaining agreement between the company and Local 2332 contained both a no-strike clause and a broad mandatory grievance procedure. 0 The district court denied injunctive relief to the employer,
but the Fourth Circuit reversed.
After describing Boys Markets as a "narrow" decision, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that whether the no-strike clause of the collective
bargaining agreement precluded sympathy strikes was an arbitrable
issue. This dispute over the interpretation of the contract was subject
77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C. 1971). Decisions in the Second Circuit are divided: an injunction was issued in Barnard College v. TWU, 372 F. Supp. 211, 85 L.R.R.M. 2392
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); an injunction was refused in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 386
F. Supp. 405, 88 L.R.R.M. 2063 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). The Sixth Circuit is also divided:

an injunction was issued in General Cable Corp. v. IBEW, Local 1798, 333 F. Supp.
331, 77 L.R.R.M. 3123 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); an injunction was refused in Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, '88 L.R.R.M. 2155 (N.D. Ohio
1974).
While Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81

L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972), an appellate decision in which an injunction was refused, is authority in the Fifth Circuit, an injunction was issued in Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc. v. Teamsters, 86 L.R.R.M. 2419 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

36.

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254, 74 L.R.R.M.

2257, 2264 (1970), quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228, 50
L.R.R.M. 2420, 2433 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

37.

468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972).

38.

484 F.2d 1209, 84 L.R.R.M. 2481 (4th Cir. 1973).

39.

Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Local 560, Teamsters, 373 F. Supp. 19, 23, 86

L.R.R.M. 2324, 2327 (D.N.J. 1974); Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typo-

graphical Union 53, 88 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2158-59 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
40.

Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1210, 1213, 84

L.R.R.M. 2481, 2482, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973).
panying notes 87 through 88 infra.
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to the mandatory grievance procedure, and therefore, grounds for -the
issuance of a Boys Markets injunction. 41 The court pointed to the "extremely broad and encompassing language" of both the no-strike and
grievance provisions. Like most courts that follow this position, the
Monongahela court justified its decision in part with the presumption
of arbitrability argument, quoting Mr. Justice Douglas in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 42 to the effect that courts should
resolve all doubts about arbitrability in favor of arbitration.4 3 Aware
that there had been some criticism of the use of this presumption in
cases following Boys Markets, the court indicated that in its view the
issue in the case was so clearly arbitrable that it would have reached
the same conclusion if it had applied the inverse presumption."
In Amstar,45 the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
represented employees at Amstar refineries in three eastern cities.
While engaged in an economic strike against Amstar, the ILA set up
picket lines at Amstar's Chalmette refinery in Louisiana, where employees were represented by the Amalgamated Meat Cutters. The collective bargaining agreement betwen Amstar and the Meat Cutters
contained both a no-strike clause and a grievance procedure found
mandatory by the lower court. 46 A majority of the Chalmette employees refused to cross the ILA picket line, and Amstar sought and obtained a Boys Markets injunction in the district court. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In a short opinion, the court
concluded that the case clearly fell outside the scope of the Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia. Simply put:
The strike . . . was not "over a grievance" which the parties were
contractually bound to arbitrate. Rather, the strike itself precipitated the dispute-the validity under the Union's no-strike47obligation of the member-employees honoring the ILA picket line.
According to this point of view, the requirement that the strike be
over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbi41.

Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1212-15, 84

42.

363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416, 2419-20 (1960).

L.R.R.M. 2481, 2483-85 (4th Cir. 1973).
43.

Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213, 84

L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973).

44.

Id. at 1214 n.13, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2484 n.13.

See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys

Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARv. L. REv. 636 (1972).

45. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644
(5th Cir. 1972).
46. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 813, 79 L.R.R.M.
2425, 2426 (E.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th
Cir. 1972). For further discussion see text accompanying notes 87 through 88 infra.

47.

Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373, 81 L.R.R.M.

2644, 2645 (5th Cir. 1972).
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trate must be read strictly: the underlying cause of the strike, not the
result, must be an arbitrable dispute between the employer and the
striking union. It is not sufficient that the strike results in an arbitrable dispute.4 8 As the court said in Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v.
Cleveland Typographical Union 53: "there is a clear difference between a labor dispute which results from a work-stoppage and workstoppage which is the result of a labor dispute . . .
From this point of view, it is absurd to say that the dispute as to
whether the union is in breach of its no-strike obligation is what the
strike is over-the cause of the strike. To see what a strike is over, one
looks at its purpose. In Amstar, for example, the union was not striking for recognition of its right to honor picket lines of other unions.
Had the employer agreed to recognize that right, those honoring the
picket line would not have returned to work. Conversely, had the ILA
removed their pickets, the sympathizers would have returned to
work.50
In sympathy strike situations, the underlying cause or dispute is between the employer and the picketing union, not between the employer and the sympathizers. This underlying dispute between the employer and the sympathizers is not arbitrable." If a different dispute
results between the employer and the sympathizing union, that is a
separate issue, perhaps an arbitrable one, but not cause for the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction. 52
The National Labor Relations Board follows the Amstar position
in its analysis of sympathy strike situation cases. In Gary-Hobart Water
Corp., the employer was charged with violating sections 8(a)(1)
48. See General Cable Corp. v. IBEW, Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478, 482, 77
L.R.R.M. 3053, 3056 (D. Md. 1971); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs
Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 330-31, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2051-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974) (Hunter, J., dissenting); accord, Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Union 14, 459 F.2d 369, 374, 80 L.R.R.M. 2264,
2267 (3d Cir. 1972).
49. 88 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2160 (N.D.Ohio 1974).
50. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 30, Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972); see NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 326 n.6, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2048 n.6
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
51. See Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 300, 87 L.R.R.M.
2733, 2738 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 300-01, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2738-39; General Cable Corp. v. IBEW, Local
1644, 331 F. Supp. 478, 482, 77 L.R.R.M. 3053, 3056 (D. Md. 1971); NAPA Pittsburgh,
Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 326-27, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2048
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
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and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act 8 for firing members of
a clerical employees union who had refused to cross the picket line of
the striking maintenance employees of Gary-Hobart. 54 The clerical
employees' collective bargaining agreement contained both a nostrike clause and a mandatory grievance procedure. The Board ordered reinstatement of the employees, finding that the no-strike
clause in the contract did not forbid their actions.5 5
After setting forth very strict standards for the waiver of statutory
rights, the Board concluded that the union had not specifically waived
the right to refuse to cross the picket line of another union. Using
A mstar language, the Board pointed out that:
The strike by the clerical unit was not over a grievance which the
parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. Rather, the strike
itself precipitated the dispute-the validity under the Union's nostrike obligation of the employee-members honoring the p & m
unit's picket line. Put differently, the dispute was between the p &
m unit and the Respondent and therefore not resolvable under the
clerical unit's grievance procedure. 6
Since the dispute was not over a grievance subject to arbitration, the
employees had not violated the contract.
The Monongahela court never dealt with the causal requirement
argument which determined the Amstar decision, apparently finding
it irrelevant to inquire into the purpose of the "strike." Assuming that
all other requirements are met, the prerequisite for a Boys Markets injunction, according to this point of view, is the existence of an arbitrable dispute between the employer and the sympathizing union. That
dispute, as in Monongahela, may simply be a disagreement as to the
legality of the strike itself.5 7
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
54. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1215 (May
21, 1974), enforced, Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M.
2830 (7th Cir. 1975).
55. Id. at 86 L.R.R.M. at 1211, 1215-16.
56. Id. at 86 L.R.R.M. at 1214.
57. All of the arbitrable disputes found by the circuit courts to justify the issuance
of Boys Markets injunctions in sympathy strike situation cases concerned some question
regarding the legality of the sympathetic action taken by individuals or groups. E.g.,
Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 297, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2736 (7th
Cir. 1974) ("whether the unions had the right under the agreement to refuse to cross
picket lines established by another union"); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974) (whether the picket line being
respected was primary or secondary); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497
F.2d 311, 313, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2339 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87
L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974) (what was the relationship between the protection of rights and
no-strike clauses in the contract and whether the union was using the preservation of
rights clause as a "subterfuge" to direct or encourage illegal concerted activity).
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As noted above, most courts follow Monongahela. Usually these

courts simply ignore the underlying dispute argument.

Some courts

make no reference whatsoever to the underlying cause requirement language of Boys Markets.5 8 Others state it, but never consider its import.59 Many courts describe the Boys Markets decision as a narrow
exception to Norris-LaGuardia, and then proceed to issue an injunction based simply on the finding of an arbitrable issue. 60 Sometimes,
courts misstate the Boys Markets holding. For example, in NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, the Third Circuit
stated that Boys Markets held that an injunction may be issued to enforce arbitration of any matter made arbitrable by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. 8 ' Similarly, in Armco Steel Corp. v.
UMW, the Fourth Circuit added language to Boys Markets, holding
that injunctive relief is appropriate where "the work stoppage is over
a grievance or involves a matter which the parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate. 6 2
Given the nature of the standard arbitration clause in collective
bargaining agreements which gives the arbitrator authority "to resolve
disputes concerning the 'interpretation and application' of a collective

bargaining agreement,"

3

it is not difficult for a court to find an ar-

bitrable issue. Further, the courts generally support their finding with
the presumption of arbitrability argument, frequently quoting Justice
Douglas in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 4 As the
Third Circuit said in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs
58. E.g., Wilmington Shipping Co. v. ILA Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545,
UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 87 LR.R.M. 2733 (7th Cir. 1974).
59. Eg., General Cable Corp. v. IBEW, Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331, 77 L.R.R.M.
3123 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 87 L.R.R.M.
2974 (4th Cir. 1974).
60. Eg., Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209,.84 LR.R.M.
2481 (4th Cir. 1973); Barnard College v. TWU, 352 F. Supp. 211, 85 L.R.R.M. 2392
(S.D.N.Y.
1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 81 L.R.R.M. 2205
(M.D.N.C. 1972), injunction dissolved, 353 F. Supp. 869, 81 L.R.R.M. 2207 (M.D.N.C.
1972), vacated in part, affd in part, 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 LR.RLM. 2399 (1974).
61. 502 F.2d 321, 323, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2045 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974).
62. 505 F.2d 1129, 1131, 87 LR.R.M. 2974, 2976 (4th Cir. 1974) (emphasis

added).
63. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1497 (1959).
64. Eg., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
323, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2045 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035
(1974); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213, 84
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129,
1132, 87 L.R.R.M. 2974, 2977 (4th Cir. 1974); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW, Local
1798, 333 F. Supp. 331, 334, 77 L.R.R.M. 3123, 3126 (W.D. Tenn.); Bethlehem Mines
Corp. v. UMW, 375 F. Supp. 980, 983, 86 L.R.R.M. 2398, 2400 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See
text accompanying note 24 supra.
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Local 926: "In cases of this nature we start with the basic premise
that the law favors arbitration of labor disputes." 5
Depending on the language of the contract provisions, the scope of
a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement may be subject
to arbitration. In Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery
Workers,"6 the Supreme Court held arbitrable an employer's claim for
damages arising from the failure of the employees to report to work
on days they claimed they were not, under the contract, required to
work.
In some sympathy strike cases, the unions agreed that there was a
dispute growing out of the alleged "strike" which was arbitrable under the contract.6 7 The existence of such an arbitrable issue does not,
however, mean that the requirements for a Boys Markets injunction
have been met.
The Amstar court pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court had
itself described the Boys Markets holding as a narrow one, intended
neither to permit injunctive relief in all cases involving arbitrable
grievances nor to undermine Norris-LaGuardia. 68 All of the dissenters from the circuit level opinions approving the issuance of Boys
Markets injunctions agree with the Amstar court that the failure to
recognize the underlying cause requirement of Boys Markets produces a justification for the enjoining of any strike where the collective bargaining agreement contains a mandatory grievance procedure.
All agree that the Monongahela position furnishes the potential for
destroying Norris-LaGuardia.6 9 As Judge Fairchild said in his dissent from Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW:
The purpose of Boys Markets was to foster the effectiveness of an
arbitration agreement by precluding resort to the strike weapon in
65. 502 F.2d 321, 323, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2045 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974).
66. 370 U.S. 254, 50 L.R.R.M 2440 (1962); accord, H.K. Porter, Inc. v. Local
37,
USW, 400 F.2d 691, 69 L.R.R.M. 2246 (4th Cir. 1968).
67. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324,
87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035

(1974)

(Hunter, J., dissenting); Wilmington Shipping Co. v. ILA Local 1426, 86

L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974).
68. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373-74, 81
L.R.R.M. 2644, 2644-45 (5th Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 1373, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2644; Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d
650, 654, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2367 (3d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., dissenting); NAPA Pitts-

burgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F*2d 321, 327-30, 87 L.R.R.M.
2044, 2049-51 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974)

(Hunter, J., dissenting); id. at 333-34, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2054-55 (Adams, J.,dissenting).

655

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6: 644

place of arbitration to which the parties had agreed. To enjoin in
the present case is not to prevent substitution of a strike weapon
for the arbitration procedure agreed upon, but to presume that
recognition of a picket line has been forbidden by the contract unless and until an arbitrator rules that it has not.7 0
The issuance of injunctions in sympathy strike situations not only
tends to undermine Norris-LaGuardia, but also does little to promote
arbitration-the policy reason behind the Boys Markets exception.
Obviously, if there is no arbitrable dispute, there is no reason to issue
an injunction. Even where an arbitrable dispute does result from the
work-stoppage, issuance of an injunction still does not promote arbitration. The employer is free to proceed to arbitration of that issue;
the injunction is not necessary to invoke the grievance-arbitration
procedure.
Judge Hunter, dissenting from the issuance of an injunction in
NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 71 believed that where the underlying cause requirement is not met, an injunction does not promote arbitration. He indicated that the dispute
between NAPA and the union was arbitrable, as was the dispute in
Boys Markets. In Boys Markets, however, the strike was an attempt
by the union to force the employer to agree to its position and to forego
arbitration. No attempt to defeat the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was
involved in NAPA. The work-stoppage, like those in the other sympathy strike cases, did not place pressure on the employer to forego
arbitration and agree to the union's position, as such a concession could
not have ended the work-stoppage. Thus, the issuance of an injunction
in NAPA did not, according to Judge Hunter, promote the policies
that led to the Boys Markets decision.
EFFECT OF PROTECTION OF RIGHTS CLAUSES

A union should, theoretically, be able to protect the statutory rights
of employees to refuse to cross picket lines by including in the collective bargaining agreement a provision specifically preserving those
rights. Three appellate level cases" involved collective bargaining
70. 505 F.2d 293, 301, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2739 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
71. 502 F.2d 321, 326-31, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2048-54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974) (Hunter J., dissenting).
72. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87
L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974);
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974); Wilmington Shipping
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agreements which included provisions specifically protecting the rights
of employees not to cross "primary" or "bona fide" picket lines.73 In
each case, however, the court found that the provision itself supplied
the basis for an arbitrable dispute and, therefore, for an injunction.
In NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926,
the Third Circuit approved the lower court's reasoning that the very inclusion of the preservation of rights provision made "the question of
the right to cross a picket line . . . part of the Agreement over which
the arbitration clause became a compulsory method of procedure which
this Court must enforce." 74 Amstar and other cases refusing a Boys
Markets injunction were distinguished on the basis that they contained
no "contractual provision restrictingthe union's right to honor the picket
lines of other labor organizations."7 5 The court found an arbitrable dispute in the parties' disagreement as to whether the picket line was
76
primary or secondary.
In Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's injunction restraining individual union members
from refusing to cross the picket line set up by another local. It held,
however, that the injunction should be reinstated as to the union itself. 7
The court found two arbitrable issues: (1) the relationship between
the no-strike clause and the protection of rights clause; and (2) whether
the union was directing or influencing concerted activity in violation
of the collective bargaining agreement."
Co. v. ILA Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022,
87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974). See also Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Drivers, Local 500,
363 F. Supp. 1254, 84 L.R.R.M. 2509 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
73. E.g., Article XIII of the collective bargaining agreement involved in NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044,
2045 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974), provided:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement . . . in the event an employee
refuses to enter upon any property involved in a primary labor dispute or refuses to go through or work behind any primary picket lines . . . at the Employer's . . . place of business.
74. Id., atf'g NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 363 F.
Supp. 54, 57, 84 L.R.R.M. 2307, 2310 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
75. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324,
87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035
(1974) (emphasis added). The court's reference to the protection of rights clause gives
rise to the curious implication that there is a statutorily protected right to honor
secondary picket lines.
In Island Creek, the dissenting judge also implied that
there is a right to honor secondary picket lines. Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW,
507 F.2d 650, 654, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2367 (3d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., dissenting).
76. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324,
87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035
(1974).
77. 497 F.2d 311, 312, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87
L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974).
78. Id. at 313, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2339.

657

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6: 644

Despite the vacating of the injunction as applied to individual employees, the inclusion of the protection of rights clause in the contract
provided only minimal aid to the union. The decision to vacate that
injunction was based on previous arbitration of the scope of that pro-

vision by the National Grievance Committee, which had ruled that the
company violated the protection of rights clause by seeking injunctive
relief against individual employees."9 Had the previous arbitration not
taken place, the inclusion of the provision in the contract would not
have prevented issuance of an injunction against the individuals. In
essence, the Fourth Circuit adopted the same rule as the Third Circuit: inclusion of the provision gives rise to a potential dispute as to its
meaning and hence, to a potentially arbitrable dispute providing

grounds for an injunction.
Wilmington Shipping Co. v. ILA, Local 1426 was also a Fourth

Circuit case in which the arbitrable dispute on which an injunction
was based was whether the picket line being respected was "bona
fide." The collective bargaining agreement had stated simply: "The

right of employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recognized by
the employer."' 0 The case was resolved on the authority of Monongahela, the court holding that the issue was one of construction of the
no-strike clause.

In view of the statutory protection granted the right to honor a
picket line, the cases involving protection of rights clauses produce

peculiar results. If, as in Monongahela, a collective bargaining agreement contains

an arbitration provision

and an express no-strike

clause, but does not contain a provision protecting the rights of employees to refuse to cross the picket lines of another union, such refusal may be enjoined. However, even if the union expressly reserves the
right to refuse to cross, the refusal to cross may still be enjoined be79. Id., 86 L.R.R.M. at 2338. The numerous Pilot Freight cases discussed in this
article grew out of an attempt by Teamsters Local 512 to secure recognition as bargaining representative for the employees of Pilot's Jacksonville, Florida terminal. The
Teamsters set up recognitional picket lines at several Pilot Freight terminals across the
country. Pilot brought suits for injunctions in five states in addition to the suit in North
Carolina which culminated in the Fourth Circuit's opinion. Injunctive relief was denied
in New Jersey and Massachusetts. After the National Grievance Committee determined
that Pilot had violated Article 9 of the National Master Freight Agreement, the federal
court in Georgia dissolved a preliminary injunction. In New York and Virginia, ex
parte temporary restraining orders issued by state courts were dissolved on removal to
federal courts. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6 n.4, Local 391, Teamsters v. Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974); see Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Local 560, Teamsters,
373 F. Supp. 19, 27 n.3, 86 L.R.R.M. 2324, 2330 n.3 (D.N.J. 1974).
80. 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 87 L.R.R.M.
2716 (1974).
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cause that right has been included in the contract and can therefore
become the subject of an arbitrable dispute."'
The justification for these decisions may derive from the closing
section of Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence for a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prethe exclusion clause is vague and
vail, particularly where, as here, 82
the arbitration clause quite broad.
Perhaps the only way to protect employees' rights to refuse to cross
picket lines is to exclude the subject from arbitration by a specific
provision in the grievance section of the contract. However, given the
trend of some of the decisions in this area, a court may hold that that
grievance section is the subject of a dispute, and therefore arbitrable
under the contract. It is submitted that protection of rights clauses
meet the Warrior-Gulf standards of the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration, where the issue under
consideration is whether the employee or union may be enjoined from
exercising those rights.
CONSIDERATION

OF OTHER

Boys Markets

REQUIREMENTS

One of the requirements for the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction is that the collective bargaining agreement contain a mandatory
grievance procedure. 83 Most of the collective bargaining agreements
involved in sympathy strike situation cases contained some variation
of the usual grievance procedure, giving the arbitrator authority to decide matters regarding the application and interpretation of the contract.8 4 The language of the grievance procedure was generally not
the determining factor in the courts' decisions. Some courts, however,
did attempt to justify their decisions by implying that the grievance
mechanism at issue in the case was especially broad.8"
81. See Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Local 560, Teamsters, 373 F. Supp. 19, 2627, 86 L.R.R.M. 2324, 2330 (D.NJ. 1974).
82. 363 U.S. 574, 584-85, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416, 2420 (1960).
83. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253, 74 L.R.R.M.
2257, 2264 (1970). For cases in which the grievance procedures were held not to be
mandatory, see Associated General Contractors of Illinois v. Illinois Conference of
Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324, 79 L.R.R.M. 2555 (7th Cir. 1972); Standard Food Products

v. Brandenburg, 436 F.2d 964, 76 L.R.R.M. 2367 (2d Cir. 1970); Emery Air Freight
Corp. v. Local 295, Teamsters, 449 F.2d 586, 78 L.R.R.M. 2466 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1066, 79 L.R.R.M. 3092 (1972).
84. E.g., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
328-29 n.ll, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2055 n.11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049,

87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974). See text accompanying note 63 supra.
85. Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213, 84
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A mandatory grievance procedure is one which is binding on both
the employer and the labor organization. It is irrelevant whether or
not the grievance procedure is "employee-oriented," i.e., one where
only the union can initiate grievances.8 6 In Amstar, the union argued
that the grievance procedure was not mandatory because it was employee-oriented, 7 but the court never discussed the matter in its opinion. The Monongahela court stated that the fact that the grievance
procedure at issue was employee-oriented was immaterial.88
Two cases in which the language of the grievance arbitration procedure was of critical importance were the Third Circuit's decision in
Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW sa and the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW. 9 ° Both cases involved inter-

pretation of the 1971 collective bargaining agreement of the United
Mine Workers, which contained a mandatory grievance procedure,
but no express no-strike clause. In the 1974 decision of Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMW, the Supreme Court, interpreting an identically worded
arbitration provision from an earlier United Mine Workers contract,
had held that where a collective bargaining agreement contains a
mandatory grievance procedure, a no-strike obligation may be implied."' The basis of the decision was the quid pro quo rationale; the
scope of the no-strike obligation was determined by the scope of the
grievance-arbitration procedure. On the authority of Gateway Coal,
both the Third and the Seventh Circuits held that there were implied
no-strike obligations coterminous in extent with the grievance procedures. Boys Markets injunctions were issued because of the exceptionally broad grievance procedure provided for in the United Mine
92
Workers contract.
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973); Barnard College v. TWU, 372 F. Supp. 211, 213,
85 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
86. Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290 (3d Cir.
1972); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 447 F.2d 945, 78
L.R.R.M. 2364 (7th Cir. 1971).
87. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 18-19, Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972).
88. Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973).
89. 507 F.2d 650, 88 LR.R.M. 2364 (3d Cir. 1975).
90. 505 F.2d 293, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733 (7th Cir. 1974).
91. 414 U.S. 368, 381-82, 85 L.R.R.M. 2049, 2054-5.5 (1974).
92. Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 651-53, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364,
2366 (3d Cir. 1975); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 298,
87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2736 (7th Cir. 1974). In addition to the usual language about differences as to the meaning and interpretation of the agreement, the United Mine Workers' grievance procedure provided a mechanism for settling differences "about matters not
specifically mentioned in the agreement, or . . . any local trouble of any kind aris[ing]
at the mine." Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d at 651, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
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In Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, a third appellate decision interpreting the 1971 United Mine Workers contract, the Fourth Circuit issued a Boys Markets injunction without reference to the breadth of
the grievance procedure. 93 The case was decided on the authority of
Monongahela with the court construing, not the grievance-arbitration provision, but the no-strike obligation which it implied on the authority of Gateway Coal. Both Monongahela and Armco involved the
question of the rights of union members who refused to cross picket
lines when they were under a no-strike obligation. The only difference, according to the Armco court, between the two cases was that
Monongahela contained an express no-strike clause. That difference,
in light of the Gateway Coal decision was irrelevant.94
The cases give some support to the position that the Boys Markets
exception may be narrower where the no-strike clause is implied rather than expressed. The Fourth Circuit's use of the implied no-strike
clause, instead of the grievance procedure, to find an arbitrable issue
-indicates that the Boys Markets exception is broader in the Fourth
Circuit than in either the Third or the Seventh circuits. Both the Third
Circuit in Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW9 5 and the Seventh Circuit
in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW96 distinguished Monongahela on the basis that their cases did not involve an express no-strike
clause. 9 7 In Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical
Union 53, the court based its refusal to issue an injunction on the underlying cause requirement discussed above. The court did indicate,
however, that were it to follow the Monongahela position, "by virtue
93. 505 F.2d 1129, 87 L.R.R.M. 2974 (4th Cir. 1974).
94. Id. at 1132-33, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2976-77.
95. 507 F.2d 650, 653-54, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2366-67 (3d Cir. 197.5).
96. 505 F.2d 293, 299, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2737-38 (7th Cir. 1974).
97. The Third Circuit has indicated that a Boys Markets injunction might not be
appropriate where a collective bargaining agreement contained neither an express no-

strike clause nor a protection of rights clause.

Compare Island Creek Coal Co. v.

UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 653-54, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2366-67 (3d Cir. 1975) with NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974) and Parade Publications v. Mailers Union 14, 459 F.2d 369, 80 L.R.R.M. 2264 (3d Cir. 1972).
A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511
F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), indicates that the circuit may not follow
the Monongahela position in injunction cases where the collective bargaining agreement

contains an express no-strike clause or lacks a grievance-arbitration procedure as broad

as that of the United Mine Workers. The court ordered enforcement of the National
Labor Relations Board's order of re-instatement and back pay to employees discharged
for participating in a sympathy strike. It stated that the general no-strike clause did

not constitute a sufficiently clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to
honor a picket line or engage in a sympathy strike. Unlike the many courts following
the Monongahela position, the Gary Hobart court indicated that the dispute was not arbitrable under the grievance procedure clause providing for arbitration of differences

as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the contract.
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of the absence of strong express no-strike clauses, the contracts would
certainly be borderline situations."98
Because the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is based on the quid pro quo rationale, the relationship between the
grievance-arbitration and no-strike provisions in a collective bargaining agreement is of great importance. For a grievance procedure to be
mandatory under Boys Markets, it must do more than simply provide
for the binding arbitration of disputes: it must place the labor organization under a no-strike obligation with regard to disputes subject to
the grievance procedure. Where a collective bargaining agreement
contains both an express no-strike clause and an arbitration provision,
the court must determine the relationship between them in order to
establish whether or not the grievance procedure is mandatory. It may
be argued that since Gateway Coal allows the implication of a nostrike clause into a collective bargaining agreement, a no-strike obligation attaches to the same extent as the grievance procedure once a
mandatory grievance procedure is found. Yet Gateway Coal allows
express negation of the implied no-strike clause; 99 and it seems to go
against both Gateway Coal and common sense to hold that the wording or scope of the express no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement cannot limit the extent of the grievance procedure.
As they did with grievance-arbitration provisions, courts granting
injunctions in sympathy strike situations sometimes buttressed their
conclusions by referring to the language of the no-strike clause. For
example, in Barnard College v. TWU, the court noted that the union
had agreed that it would "'not call or countenance any form of strike'
...
."100 The no-strike language, however, was not the critical factor in any of these cases.
Some courts have assumed that the presumption of arbitrability includes the presumption that the grievance procedure is mandatory.
For example, in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs
Local 926, the collective bargaining agreement at issue contained a
grievance procedure which ended by providing that "[t]here shall be
no cessation of work during the pendency of the grievance proceedings."''0 This was the only "no-strike" clause in the contract. In its
98. 88 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2162 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
99. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.s. 368, 382, 85 L.R.R.M. 2049, 2054-55
(1974).
100. 372 F. Supp. 211, 212, 85 LR.R.M. 2392, 2393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
101. 502 F.2d 321, 328-29 n.11, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2050 n.11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R..M. 3035 (1974).
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brief supporting dismissal of the petition for an injunction, the union
argued that the collective bargaining agreement did not contain a nostrike clause. 10 2 The lower court found the grievance procedure to be
mandatory on the basis of language in the contract evincing a purpose
10 3
to do away with strikes, and issued an injunction.
In only two cases where injunctions were refused did the wording
of the no-strike clauses appear to determine the courts' decisions. In
Simplex Wire and Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, the collective bargaining agreement provided that the Union would not "cause or sanction a strike or work-stoppage. . . because of any disputes over matters relating to this Agreement."' 4 Since nothing in the agreement
related to the union's obligation with regard to picket lines of other
unions, the court found no dispute arbitrable under the contract and
refused to issue an injunction. 10 5 In Ourisman Chevrolet Co., Inc. v.
Automotive Lodge, 1486, the no-strike clause prohibited a "[s]trike,
work stoppage, or slowdown authorized or sanctioned by the Union
.... ,"106 This clause furnished the basis for the court's finding that
an injunction was inappropriate because the failure of employees to
report to work was not concerted union action." 7
Before issuing a Boys Markets injunction, a court must also find
that an injunction is warranted under the ordinary principles of equity. °8 In general, courts consider the equities in a mechanical fashion.
Often, the district court will find irreparable harm to the employer
and to the public, that the employer has no adequate remedy at law,
and will state something to the effect that "[t]he plaintiffs and the
public interest will suffer more from denial of an injunction than will
the Union and its employees from its issuance.' 10°9 Sometimes a simple
102. Brief in Support of the Union's Position Requesting the Court to Dismiss the
Petition, reprinted in App. to Brief of Appellants at 14a, NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974).
103. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 363 F. Supp. 54,
56, .84 LR.R.M. 2307, 2309 (W.D. Pa. 1973), a'd,
502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974).
104. 314 F. Supp. 885, 88546, 75 L.R.R.M. 2475, 2476 (D.N.H. 1970).
105. Id. at 886, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
106. 77 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2085 (D.D.C. 1971).

107.

Id. at 2087. That the court based its decision not to issue an injunction in part

on the wording of the no-strike clause is shown by the emphasis it added to the contract
language. The Ourisman decision, however, was basically determined by the court's factual finding that those who had refused to cross the picket line had done so on individual
principles and by the court's legal conclusion that such individual refusal was protected
activity. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 124 through 126 infra.
108. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254, 74 L.R.R.M.
2257, 2264 (1970).
109. Wilmington Shipping Co. v. ILA Local 1426, 86 LR.R.M. 2845, 2846
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statement of harm to the plaintiff suffices. 110 Only rarely does a court
give an explanation of its conclusion. It is this way of handling the injunction remedy, sometimes issued ex parte, which arouses the fear
that courts may again be given the mandate to use the injunction as
an anti-labor tool, as in the days before Norris-LaGuardia."'
If a court decides not to issue a Boys Markets injunction for some
reason, such as the failure to meet the underlying cause requirement,
it does not usually reach a discussion of the equities. In none of the reported sympathy strike situation cases did a court find that all of the
other requirements for a Boys Markets injunction had been met, but
that the equities favored the labor organization.
In only one of the reported cases were the needs of the union and
the public's interest in those needs given any attention. In Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, the court decided not to issue an injunction because of a failure to meet the underlying cause requirement, but went on to discuss the other
requirements cf Boys Markets. Taking note of the union tradition of
respecting picket lines, the court stated that the "[i]njunction is an
equitable remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used
sparingly and only in a clear and plain case . . . ,,112 The court then
proceeded to discuss the potential violence that might result from an
attempt to cross a picket line in a community with a long history of
unionism. Because of this potential violence, the equities were against
ordering the defendants to cross the picket line.'
According to the National Labor Relations Board, sympathy
strikes and the right to honor another union's picket line are protected
because part of the purpose in protecting the right to strike is to allow
"for mutual aid and protection of employees of members of another
union.""' Protection is given by the law to those who honor picket
(E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022,
87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974); see Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 81 L.R.R.M.
2205, 2206 (M.D.N.C. 1972), injunction dissolved, 353 F. Supp. 869, 81 L.R.R.M.
2207 (M.D.N.C. 1972), vacated in part, aff'd in part, 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974); Bethlehem Mines
Corp. v. UMW, 375 F. Supp. 980, 984, 86 L.R.R.M. 2398, 2402 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
110. E.g., Barnard College v. TWU, 372 F. Supp. 211, 213, 85 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2394
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
111. See Gentile, Injunctive Relief: An Old Remedy Rejuvenated, in PROCEEDINGS
OF NEW YORK UNIVERSrIY, TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 143
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Gentile].
112. 88 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2162 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
113. Id. at 2163.
114. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213 (May
21, 1974), enforced, Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M.
2830 (7th Cir. 1975).
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lines out of principle, not out of fear.' 1 5 As our national labor policy
is based in part on such considerations, courts weighing the equities in
sympathy strike situations ought to consider the needs of the picketing
union as well as those of the sympathizing union. As the strike is a legitimate economic weapon, courts should take a wider view in injunction cases and consider the effect of their actions on the union movement as a whole.
WHAT RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED?

The Role of the Union in BringingAbout the Refusal to Work
One of the most complicated factors in sympathy strike cases is the
relationship between individual and group action. There is disagreement as to whether an individual member of a union with a no-strike
clause in its collective bargaining agreement can independently exercise his or her statutory right to honor a legitimate picket line. The
difficulties arise in part from the lack of clarity in the law as to what is
protected activity and how protected rights may be waived. For that
reason, some cases speak of the individual's right to honor a picket
line; others speak of the honoring of picket lines by a union or by union members. Some speak of sympathy strikes, referring to the actions
of individuals, union members, or the union itself. Others refer to
work-stoppages.
The role of the sympathizing union may vary greatly in sympathy
strike situations. The union may advise members of a statutory or
contractual right not to cross a picket line, suggest that members not
cross, or officially recognize the original strike and order its members,
under threat of sanction, to respect the picket line. The union may
take no position, no official position, or may advise or order its members to cross the picket line.
The cases show no uniform relationship between the propriety of
an injunction in a sympathy strike situation and the role played by the
union in producing the failure of employees to report to work. Sometimes the differences in the decisions are attributable to factors such
as the underlying dispute requirement. It is clear, however, that the
courts are applying different criteria in judging what is protected activity. One of the arguments of the union in Amstar was that those
who respected the picket line were acting on their individual union
115. NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 76 L.R.R.M. 2181 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826, 78 L.R.R.M. 2465 (1971).
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principles.116 The Fifth Circuit ignored this argument, called the action a "strike," but still did not issue an injunction.11 7 Apparently, under Amstar, a union can order a sympathy strike and, because that
strike would not be "over a grievance" the parties were contractually
bound to arbitrate, a Boys Markets injunction would be inappropriate.'
The union involved in the Monongahela case also maintained that those who honored the picket line had done so on individual principles;1 1 9 however, the court, noting that the union took no
action to end the "strike," approved issuance of an injunction.1 20
In Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, the Fourth Circuit
strongly intimated that it considered a union-directed refusal to cross
the picket line an illegal strike.1 21 In a number of cases the district
courts made specific findings that the sympathizing union had ordered a strike; some of these courts granted injunctions,122 while oth1 23
ers did not.
The only case in which the district court's finding with regard to
the union role was decisive is Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive
Lodge 1486. The court found that the honoring of the picket line by
union members "were individual decisions based on principle, neither
expressly nor impliedly concerted union action, and thus legitimate."' 2 4 The no-strike clause of the sympathizers' union's contract
prohibited strikes "authorized or sanctioned by the Union."'2 5 A union official twice advised the members to go to work. According to
the court, on three succeeding days:
116. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 45-47, Amstar v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1392, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972).
117. Amstar v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th
Cir. 1972).
118. The union might, however, be liable for damages. Compare Rhode Island &
M Associates v. Local 99-99A, Operating Engineers, 88 L.R.R.M. 2007 (D.D.C. 1974)
and Kelley-Nelson Construction Co. v. Construction and Laborers' Union 107, 80
L.R.R.M. 2334 (W.D. Ark. 1972) with 12th & L Ltd. Partnership v. Local 99-99A, Operating Engineers, 88 L.R.R.M. 2572 (D.D.C. 1975).
119. Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2485 (4th Cir. 1973).
120. Id. at 1210, 1215, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2482, 2485.
121. 497 F.2d 311, 313, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2339 (4th Or.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974).
122. E.g., General Cable v. IBEW, Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331, 332-33, 77
L.R.R.M. 3123, 3125 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. UMW, 375 F.
Supp. 980, 984, 86 L.R.R.M. 2398, 2401 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
123. E.g., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Local 560, Teamsters, 373 F. Supp. 19, 21,
86 L.R.R.M. 2324, 2325 (D.NJ. 1974); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331
F. Supp. 478, 481, 77 L.R.R.M. 3053, 3055 (D. Md. 1971); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 386 F. Supp. 405, 409, 88 L.R.R.M. 2063, 2066 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
124. 77 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2087 (D.D.C. 1971).
125. Id. at 2085.
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the rank and file machinists members . . . assembled [near the
employer's premises] voted by secret ballot, on their own initiative and personal convictions, not to cross the picket line of Teamsters Local 922. Individuals were not bound by the result of the
vote. They could work or not, with the decision left to the individual. .

.

. There was no formal motion on the vote nor was there

a formal procedure. It was a spontaneous act by
the individual
machinists assembled and not a concerted activity.' 2 6
Implied No-Strike Clauses: Implied Waiver of Statutory Rights
The right to strike and the right to honor a legitimate picket line
are subject to waiver by appropriate provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. In 1956, the Supreme Court held in Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB that the right to strike against unfair labor practices
could be waived only by an explicit contractual provision. 12 7 It should
be noted that the Mastro decision followed the passage of the TaftHartley Act, which expressed Congressional preference for arbitration as the means to settle labor disputes. Thus, at the time of the
Mastro decision, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the Congressional policy favoring arbitration and the requirement of a clear
and explicit waiver of the statutory right to strike.
In NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., the Supreme Court
held that the right to honor a picket line at the place of business of an
employer other than one's own can be waived by inclusion of a nostrike clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 2 " While this case is
consistently cited for the proposition that a no-strike clause waives a
member's statutory right to refuse to cross a picket line,' 2 9 the case is
distinguishable from the sympathy strike situations under discussion
in this article. First, it dealt with the National Labor Relations Act,
section 8(b)(4)(D) proviso"s0 concerning arguably secondary activity
-the refusal to cross a picket line encountered in the course of
doing one's job-not a primary picket line at the site of one's employment. Second, in Rockaway, there was evidence of a futile attempt by
the union to have a provision stating that "[n]o man shall be required
126. Id. at 2086.
127. 350 U.S. 270, 279, 37 LR.R.M. 2587 (1956). The Court based its decision
in part on section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970),
which indicates that the Act should not be construed to restrict or qualify the right to
strike, except where a specific provision mandates such a restriction or qualification.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 284, 37 L.R.R.M. 2587, 2592-93 (1956).
128. 345 U.S. 71, 31 LR.R.M. 2432 (1953).
129. Eg., Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84
LR.R.M. 2481, 2485 (4th Cir. 1973).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970).
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to cross a picket line" included in the Agreement.'' Finally, Rockaway was decided in 1953, before Mastro PlasticsCorp. v. NLRB.
The Supreme Court has also held that no-strike obligations may be
implied by law. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., an action
by an employer for damages caused by a strike alleged to be in breach
of contract, the Court ruled that a no-strike obligation would be implied to cover that part of the collective bargaining agreement subject
to compulsory arbitration. 13 Dicta in Boys Markets further indicated
that the Court would apply the exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act where the no-strike obligation was implied as well as expressed.133 Finally, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW specifically held that
in an injunction action, as well as in an action for damages, a nostrike obligation could be implied by law."3 4 Apparently moving away
from the reasoning in Mastro that a statutory right could be waived
only by explicit contractual provision, the Gateway Court stated that
where there was a mandatory grievance procedure, the parties would
be required to:
expressly negate any implied no strike obligation. Such a contract
would reinstate the situation commonly existing before our decision
in Boys Markets. Absent an explicit expression of such an intention, however, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike
35
should be construed as having coterminous application.1
The application of the Gateway doctrine to the right to honor picket lines of another union is not clear. The National Labor Relations
Board and many courts have applied, and continue to apply, the strict
standards of Mastro.1 1 6 The requirement that a "waiver will not be
readily inferred and there must be a clear and unmistakeable showing
that waiver occurred" has been applied to the right to respect another
37
union's picket line and the right to partake in a sympathy strike.1
131. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 345 U.S. 71, 80, 31 L.R.R.M. 2432,
2436 (1953).
132. 369 U.S. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717 (1962).

133.

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248, 74 L.R.R.M.

2257, 2261 (1970).
134. 414 U.S. 368, 85 L.R.R.M. 2049 (1974).
135. Id. at 382, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2055.
136. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213 (May
21, 1974), enforced, Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M.
2830 (7th Cir. 1975); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 54 L.R.R.M.
2785 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971, 55 L.R.R.M. 2878 (1964); NLRB v.
Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d 393, 76 L.R.R.M. 2576 (7th Cir. 1971).
137. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213 (May
21, 1974), enforced, Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M.

2830 (7th Cir. 1975); Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 79 L.R.R.M. 2897 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850, 81 L.R.R.M. 2390 (1972); Newspaper Production Co.
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Some authorities hold that the right of an individual, on union
principles, to honor a picket line is separate and distinct from the union's right to strike; it remains even where the employee who fails to
report to work is a member of a union with a no-strike clause in its
contract,13 8 or even a no-sympathy strike clause.' 39 Other authorities
maintain that the right to engage in a union-sanctioned sympathy
strike is not automatically waived by the inclusion of a no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Waiver of that right
140
must be clear and explicit.
In a case involving a collective bargaining agreement with a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure and an express no-strike
clause, the Monongahela court, on the basis of Rockaway News, concluded that the no-strike clause of the contract waived the right to
honor a picket line.' This position presumes that the right to strike
and the right to honor a picket line are synonymous and that the parties intended such a waiver. In view of the long history of union respect for picket lines, it is doubtful that this presumption is correct.
In other cases the courts have sent the question of the relationship
between the no-strike clause and the statutory right to honor a picket
line to arbitration, often indicating that the parties intended arbitration of this issue.' 42 As an injunction will end the sympathetic action,
it should not be assumed that the labor organization intended the
question of the rights of its members to cross picket lines to be arbitrable. Arbitration is unlikely to settle the question of the rights of those
engaged in sympathetic action until after the end of the original
strike. 4'
Furthermore, in cases involving protection of rights clauses, it is
improper to assume the parties intended to arbitrate the meaning of
those clauses after issuance of an injunction. Protection of rights
clauses constitute sufficiently explicit expressions of the intention not
v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821, 87 L.R.R.M. 2650 (5th Cir. 1974). But cf., Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088, 79 L.R.R.M. 2854 (8th Cir. 1972).
138. Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive Lodge 1468, 77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C.
1971).
139. Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 79 L.R.R.M. 2897 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 850, 81 L.R.R.M. 2390 (1972).
140. Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830,
2831-32 (7th Cir. 1975).
141. Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2485 (4th Cir. 1973).
142. Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 298, 87 LR.R.M. 2733,
2737 (7th Cir. 1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311, 313, 86
L.R.R.M. 2337, 2339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974).
143. For discussion of delays in the arbitration process, see text accompanying notes
165 through 167 infra.
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to waive the right to engage in sympathetic action to meet even the
Gateway standards. There is nothing in the Gateway decision to suggest that a labor organization must completely, and without exceptions, either waive or preserve the right to strike.
A different problem is presented where the collective bargaining
agreement does not contain an express no-strike clause, but one is implied due to a mandatory grievance procedure. Some courts look to
the scope of the grievance procedure to determine whether the right to
honor a picket line has been waived."' Others assume that the inclusion of a mandatory grievance procedure in the collective bargaining
agreement automatically waives the right to honor a picket line.
In Armco Steel v. UMW, a case involving a collective bargaining
agreement which did not contain a no-strike clause, the court stated:
"'the statutory right of employees to refuse to cross a picket line . . .
may be waived . . . by the action of their union in agreeing to a no
strike clause.' "145 The union, of course, never agreed to a no-strike

clause. It was implied by law, as was the included waiver of an individual's statutory right to refuse to cross a picket line. The contract
contained a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure. Using the
presumption of arbitrability, the court found an arbitrable dispute
subject to that procedure. Because of the existence of such a dispute,
the court implied a no-strike obligation and, from this, implied a
waiver of the right to refuse to cross a picket line. Thus, the employees' statutory right to refuse, on union principles, to cross the picket
line of another union was waived by an implied implication based on
a presumption.
Implied no-strike clauses received considerable criticism from Mr.
Justice Black. In his dissent to Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour

Co., he indicated that the Court was re-writing the parties' contract in
a way unjustifiable by "any accepted principle of contract law-traditional or otherwise."' 4' 6 He pointed to the fact that the parties themselves had included a no-strike obligation with regard to the settlement of disputes about the interpretation of the contract, but had
omitted any such obligation with regard to the settlement of differ144.

See Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364 (3d Cir.

1975); Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 87 LR.R.M. 2733 (7th
Cir. 1974).
145. 505 F.2d 1129, 1133, 87 L.R.R.M. 2974, 2977 (4th Cir. 1974), quoting
Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84 LR.R.M. 2481,

2485 (4th Cir. 1973).
146. 369 U.S. 95, 108, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2723 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
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ences between the employer and the employee.1 4 7 In Black's dissent in
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., he stated that the courts should
not construe contracts to waive statutory rights without a showing of
148
clear intent by the parties.
Mr. Justice Black's objections to implied no-strike provisions were
also based on his view of the importance of labor's right to strike and
his objections to the quid pro quo rationale:
[A]s was recognized in both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,
the strike has been the unions' most important weapon of persuasion. To say that the right to strike is inconsistent with the contractual duty to arbitrate sounds like a dull echo of the argument
which used to be so popular that the right to strike was inconsistent
with the contractual duty to work-an argument which frequently
went so far as to say that strikes 9are inconsistent with both the
common law and the Constitution. 14
MUST THE DISTRICT COURT MAKE A FINDING
OF A VIOLATION OF A NO-STRIKE OBLIGATION?

An ambiguity in the cases following Boys Markets, of critical importance to sympathy strike situation cases, is whether the district
court must make a finding of a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's no-strike obligation before issuing an injunction. If such
a finding must be made, the majority trend is incorrect in rejecting the
underlying cause requirement. Disputes sent to arbitration in these
cases concern, in various forms, the legality of the "strike" itself. Depending on the wording of the collective bargaining agreement, the
legality of the strike may be an appropriate subject for arbitrational
determination in certain contexts, such as where the employer is seeking damages or where employees have been discharged for failing to
report to work. However, the propriety of determination of the issue
by arbitration in those circumstances is irrelevant to the question of
jurisdiction to issue an injunction. The rationale behind the Boys Markets
injunction is the quid pro quo argument: a strike is illegal if it is over
a grievance that is subject to mandatory arbitration. If the "grievance"
is the very legality of the strike, and if the district court must make
such a finding, then there is nothing for the arbitrator to decide. 5 '
147.
148.

Id. at 106-07, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2722.
345 U.S. 71, 81-82, 31 L.R.R.M. 2432, 2437 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).

149. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 109, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717,
2723 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).

150. Whether a court must find a violation of the no-strike obligation before issuing
an injunction is a question which is easily overlooked in the usual Boys Markets case
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If a prima facie, arguably illegal, or any other showing of breach of
a no-strike obligation suffices at the district court level, the merits of
the issue may be left for arbitrational determination. However, the underlying cause requirement argument is not defeated, for other questions of interpretation and policy remain. Also, in view of the lack of
clarity on this major issue, any lesser showing of illegality should be
critically examined to see if it meets the mandate of Boys Markets.
Some commentators assume that the district courts may enjoin only
illegal strikes.' 5 ' In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, the court stated that before an injunction can issue "the court must find . . . that
the strike is in breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective
agreement."' 52 Specific findings of illegality have been made by some
153

courts.

At least one court has held that the sympathizing union's activities
were "arguably" violations of the mandatory grievance and no-strike
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement."' In other cases,
the courts simply found that the dispute was subject to mandatory arbitration. In referring the matter to arbitration, the district court in
Amstar v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters stated that it was not making a
decision on the merits of the dispute and that that determination was
within the arbitrator's jurisdiction.' 55
Boys Markets specifically and directly ordered the courts to determine whether or not the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate
the dispute, stating that " 'the District Court may issue no injunctive
where the grievance is not the very legality of the strike. To issue a Boys Markets injunction, a court is required to find a mandatory grievance procedure and a no-strike
obligation. Obviously, a showing must also be made that a strike was in progress. The
purpose of the strike would not be at issue. If the strike were enjoined, the parties
would be ordered to arbitrate the grievance over which the strike was called. The determination that the no-strike obligation had been breached would have been made in
the district court and the arbitrator would concern himself or herself solely with the
merits of the underlying grievance.
151. See C. MoRRis, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, THE BoARn, THE COURTS, AND)
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 76 (Supp. 1971); Relias, The Developing Law
Under Boys Markets, 23 LAB. L.J. 758, 759 (1972).
152. 386 F. Supp. 405, 409, 88 L.R.R.M. 2063, 2066 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
1.53. E.g., Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 81 L.R.R.M. 2205, 2206
(M.D.N.C. 1972), injunction dissolved, 353 F. Supp. 869, 81 L.R.R.M. 2207 (M.D.N.C.
1972), vacated in part, aff'd in part, 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974); Bethlehem Mines v. UMW, 375 F.
Supp. 980, 984, 86 L.R.R.M. 2398, 2401 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Food Drivers Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1254, 1258, 84 L.R.R.M. 2509, 2513 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
154. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 86 L.R.R.M. 2419, 2525 (N.D. Ga.
1974).
155. 337 F. Supp. 810, 817, 79 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2429 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 468 F.2d
1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972).
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order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect.' "'"
The decision was based on the quid pro quo rationale.' 57 As applied
in Gateway and succeeding cases, the quid pro quo rationale assumes
that once a grievance is found to be subject to mandatory arbitration,
it is, by definition, a grievance to which a no-strike obligation attaches. The jurisdictional fact on which injunctive relief under Boys
Markets rests is not the abstract existence of a no-strike obligation,
but the finding of that obligation in a particular case.
The following propositions therefore follow: (1) under Boys Markets a district court is required to make a finding that the strike is illegal; and (2) if such a finding is not made explicitly, it must have been
made implicitly. Courts following the Monongahela position in sympathy strike situation cases have reached decisions on the merits of the
cases, while claiming to leave the decision to the arbitration process.
This difficulty, it is submitted, arises from misinterpretation of the underlying cause requirement of Boys Markets. The inconsistencies disappear if the grievance-what the strike is about-is distinct from the
right to strike itself.
Further difficulty arises from the use of the presumption of arbitrability, a presumption which is of questionable validity in Boys Markets cases.15 s Given the coterminous application of no-strike and
grievance-arbitration clauses in cases involving implied no-strike
clauses, when the court presumes (resolves all doubts in favor of) arbitrability, it is impliedly presuming that the strike is illegal. While an
express no-strike clause of limited scope gives the court the means to
negate the presumption of arbitrability, it may also provide the court
with a problem of contract interpretation that it will presume to be
arbitrable.
The presumption of arbitrability doctrine arose out of cases dealing
with actions for orders to arbitrate, not actions for injunctions. Use of
such a presumption has no place in actions for injunctions.
156. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254, 74 L.R.R.M.
2257, 2264 (1970), quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228, 50
L.R.R.M. 2420, 2433 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 248, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2261.
158. See, e.g., Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 H~Av. L. REv. 636 (1972). But see Note, The New Federal Law of Labor
Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593, 1602-03 (1970). See also NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 334, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2055 (3d Cir.)
(Adams J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974):
"Absent a clear signal from the Supreme Court, doubts should be resolved in favor of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Accord, New York Telephone Co. v. Communications
Workers of America, 445 F.2d 39, 50, 77 L.R.R.M. 2785, 2792 (2d Cir. 1971).
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The sympathy strike cases, then, point to an important problem regarding the interpretation of Boys Markets. It may be argued that a
prima facie, arguable, or probable violation should suffice. Any such
standard, while perhaps meeting the demands of equity jurisdiction in
other areas of the law is, it is submitted, insufficient under Boys Mar159
kets.
PROBLEMS OF OUR NATIONAL LABOR POLICY

Conflict Between the Courts and the NLRB
As noted above, the majority trend at the appellate level in sympathy strike situation cases is in direct conflict with the position of the
National Labor Relations Board. 160 Sympathy strike situation cases
come before the Board in different contexts than before the courts.
For example, an unfair labor practice charge may be filed after employees are disciplined or discharged for failing to cross a picket line
and report to work. The importance of the disagreement with the
Board depends, in part, on the degree to which that agency continues
to adhere to its policy of deferring to arbitration unfair labor practice
cases involving alleged contract violations covered by the grievance
procedure of the collective bargaining agreement.6 1 To the extent
that this trend continues, the problems of sympathy strikers and their
employers will be settled by the same arbitration process which decides disputes that are deferred by the courts following Monongahela.
The disagreement between the Board and the courts raises certain
problems. First, in some cases the Board, for various reasons, may not
exercise its discretion to defer to arbitration. In these cases, the decisions as to the rights of employees may well depend on the forum in
which they find themselves. Second, the division between the Board
and the courts tends to defeat the often stated goal of a uniform na159.

For an argument that an "arguably legal" standard does not fit the mandate

of Boys Markets, see Note, 88 HARV. L REv. 463, 467 (1974).
160. See text accompanying notes 51 through 56 supra.
161. Unfair labor practice cases are deferred to arbitration where the issues involved
are covered by the parties' arbitration procedure. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.

837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).

The Board defers to the arbitration award if "the pro-

ceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and
the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act." Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153
(1955).
Recently the Board held that in a discipline or discharge case, it will honor
the arbitrator's award without evidence that an unfair labor practice issue was presented
to or considered by the arbitrator. A party failing to raise an issue before an arbitrator, when it was possible to do so, waives his or her right to present the issue to the
Board. Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M.
1211 (Sept. 30, 1974).
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tional labor policy. 1 2 Finally, the conflict between the Board and the
courts questions the Board's supposed expertise in the area of labor
relations."' 3
Sympathy Strike Situationsand Arbitration
Since the effectiveness of a strike depends on its timing, the injunction is a potent weapon against the strike.'8 4 Despite the suggestions
of some courts that arbitration of the legality of the sympathy "strike"
can be performed on an expedited basis,165 it is doubtful that such a
procedure would furnish adequate protection to the right to strike.
Even if an arbitration decision is made within a few days, the strike is
likelyto lose its impact once an injunction is issued. Further, it is unlikely that such rapid decisions can be made. 168 There is currently a
great shortage of arbitrators and long time-delays in arbitration." 7
Experiments with "quickie arbitration" have generally been confined
to the settlement of simple and recurring grievance problems, not to
problems of the complexity of those in sympathy strike situations.6 8
The complexity involved in these cases raises the question of
whether they properly belong in the arbitration forum. The factors to
be considered by the arbitrator require not only interpretation of contractual rights, but also interpretation of statutory rights. There is a
great controversy about what kinds of decisions should be left to arbitrational determination. 169 Some commentators argue that decisions 17as0
to statutory rights belong in the courts or with the Labor Board.
162. See generally Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 49
L.R.R.M. 2717, 2720-21 (1962); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 45657, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2116 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838 (1959); Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274,77 L.R.R.M. 2501 (1971).
163. See generally Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y., 309 U.S. 261, 6 LRR.M. 669 (1940); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303
U.S. 41, 1-A L.R.R.M. 575 (1938).
164. See Gentile, supra note I11 at 155; Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 467 (1969).
165. E.g., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d
321, 324, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M.
3035 (1974).
166. Id. at 328-29, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2050 (Hunter, J., dissenting).

167.

Cohen, The Search for Innovative Procedures in Labor Arbitration, 29 ARD. J.

(n.s.) 104, 107 (1974).
168. See id. at 106-11.
169. See R. FLEMMwo, Tim LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965); P. HAYS, LABOR
ARITrrRATIoN, A DISSENTING

VIEW (1966);

H.

WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL

PROCESS (1968).
170. See Friedman and Carmell, The Arbitrator and the NLRB: Workshop Sessions in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL
MEETING. THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS 112-18, 14346 (1967).

See

generally P. HAYS, LABOR AirITRATION, A DIssErNo Vmw (1966).
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Others see Boys Markets itself as an invasion of the province of the arbitrator, the expert in the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements.' 7 ' One writer believes that the Boys Markets decision
"sacrifice[s] the 'core purpose' of Norris-La Guardia" and "threatens
172
the arbitral process itself.'
In sympathy strike situation cases courts often defer to the arbitrator's determination of the legality of the picketing. In the three circuit
court cases involving protection of rights clauses, the courts deferred
to the arbitrator's judgment as to whether the picketing was primary,
secondary, or bona fide. 17 1 In all of these cases, the arbitrator was required to decide if the statutory right to honor a picket line was
waived. To say that an arbitrator simply looks to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and to the intent of the parties is an oversimplification of the process.
Alternatives
Given the conflict in our national labor policy between, the right to
strike and the preference for arbitration as a means of settling labor
disputes, a number of alternatives exist to the Monongahela resolution
of sympathy strike situation problems. Courts could issue injunctions
and order expedited arbitration, dissolving the injunction if a rapid
decision is not reached. Courts could order expedited arbitration
without issuing an injunction, or could follow the Amstar line of authorities and not issue injunctions.
Parties to collective bargaining agreements objecting to the use of
injunctions in these situations could incorporate into their grievance
arbitration provisions a clause specifically depriving the arbitrator of
jurisdiction over:
any matter relating to the right to honor a union's picket line on
individual principles or as a union-authorized sympathy strike or
as to the interpretation of this clause or its relationship and application to the remainder of this Agreement where an injunction has
been issued and arbitration has been ordered over such matters.
171.

See Teple, Deferral to Arbitration, Implications of NLRB Policy, 29 AMw. J.

(n.s.) 65 (1974).
172. Markson, The End of an Experiment in Arbitral Supremacy: The Death of
Sinclair, 21 LAB. L.J. 645, 649-50 (1970).
173. Wilmington Shipping v. ILA, Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.

1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311,

86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399 (1974).
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Finally, Congress could repeal Norris-LaGuardia.
The district
court in Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 560 refused
the requested injunction because the Boys Markets underlying cause
requirement had not been met and the case did not fall within that decision's narrow exception to Norris-LaGuardia. Clearly expressing
the view that an injunction would be desirable on policy grounds, the
court indicated that major changes in the field of labor law should
74
come from the legislature and not the judiciary.1
CONCLUSION

The majority trend at the appellate level in sympathy strike situation cases does not meet the mandate of Boys Markets. The courts
have misinterpreted the underlying cause requirement of Boys Markets so as to allow, potentially, for an injunction whenever an employer alleges that there is a dispute under the contract. Injunctions have
been issued in such a mechanical fashion as to give rise to the same
type of abuse of the injunction remedy by the courts that prompted
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The United States Supreme Court has recently refused petitions for
certiorari in three cases.' 7 5 In view of the conflict among the courts
and the goal of a uniform national labor policy, the Court should resolve the disagreement as to the applicability of Boys Markets to sympathy strike situations.
Finally, consideration should be given to the protection our society
wishes to give the right to strike and the right to honor a picket line. If
societal values or conditions have changed to such an extent since the
passage of Norris-LaGuardia that the enjoining of almost any strike is
desirable, then Congress should repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
CAROLE

J. KOHN

174. 373 F. Supp. 19, 28, 86 L.R.R.M. 2324, 2331 (D.NJ. 1974).
175. Wilmington Shipping Co. v. ILA, Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 87 L.R.R.M. 2716 (1974); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1049, 87 L.R.R.M. 3035 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters, 497
F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 87 L.R.R.M. 2399
(1974).
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